On 12 December 2025 the Financial Conduct Authority fined Nationwide Building Society £44,078,500 for weak anti-financial crime systems and controls between October 2016 and July 2021. The figure already includes a 30 percent discount for agreeing to resolve the case. Without that discount the penalty would have been £62,969,297.
The FCA's case is about ordinary retail accounts, not a private-bank niche. Nationwide's systems for keeping due diligence and risk assessments current on personal current account customers were ineffective, and so was its transaction monitoring. The society did not have a reliable picture of which customers presented higher financial crime risk.
Nationwide also knew some customers were using personal accounts for business, which broke its terms. It did not offer business current accounts at the time, so it had no process built for the risks that business activity brings. Personal-account controls were asked to do a job they were not designed for.
One case makes the miss concrete. A customer used personal current accounts to receive fraudulent Covid furlough payments: 24 payments totalling £27.3 million over 13 months, of which £26.01 million arrived in eight days. HMRC recovered £26.5 million. About £800,000 was still outstanding when the FCA described the case.
Nationwide knew the systems were weak and started work to improve them. The FCA says the weaknesses were not dealt with in time. A large-scale financial crime transformation programme began in July 2021, at the end of the period covered by the notice.
The regulator put the fine in a longer series. Since 2021 it has imposed 13 fines on banks for anti-money laundering systems and controls, totalling £300,767,526. Building societies are not a separate, softer category in that count.
Retail banks should test whether their personal-account rules actually stop business use, or only prohibit it on paper. If customers are taking trade receipts, payroll, or marketplace payouts into a personal account, the monitoring scenarios have to match that behaviour.
Velocity still matters. Eight days and £26 million is not a subtle typology. Institutions should be able to show that a burst of that size on a personal account produces a same-week review, with a named owner, even when the customer was onboarded years earlier.
Document the gap between the date a control weakness is known and the date it is fixed. The Nationwide notice is, in large part, a case about that gap.